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U.S. Discovery in Aid of Investor-State 
Arbitrations: A Blessing or a Curse? 
MELISSA STEAR GORSLINE
†





Many U.S. lawyers and their clients, and even the U.S. Supreme 
Court, believe that arbitration is a faster, cheaper alternative to 
traditional litigation.1  And, in general, they are correct in that belief; 
a typical arbitration lacks the lengthy and costly motions and 
discovery processes one finds in U.S. litigation.2  But not all 
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 1.  S. I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing 
International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 302 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Animal Feeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the 
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of 
private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability 
to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”). 
 2.  See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that efficiency and cost-effectiveness are characteristics of arbitration 
which are “at odds with full-scale litigation in the courts, and especially at odds 
with the broad-ranging discovery made possible by the Federal Rules of Civil 
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arbitrations can be said to follow the “faster and cheaper” model.  In 
particular, international Investor-State arbitrations (ISAs), which are 
decided by international tribunals governed by bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) or similar instruments, have long been the exception 
to the general rule.3 One reason is that the stakes are usually higher in 
these arbitrations than in typical commercial arbitrations. For 
example, according to 2014 data, the average amount claimed in 
ISAs is nearly USD $500,000,000.4  Another reason is that ISA 
disputes generally involve complicated issues of law, applied to 
highly contentious, technical and factual scenarios.5  As one 
commentator has noted, these are “high-profile, bet-the-company and 
bet-the-country issues,” and their legal and factual complexities have 
led them to be dubbed “the brain surgery of international 
arbitration.”6 
With these factors rendering ISA disputes longer and costlier, 
they were already more akin to litigation than to traditional 
commercial arbitration.7  The expected cost and time associated with 
ISA disputes increases still further when one considers that U.S. 
discovery is increasingly being sought in aid of such arbitrations.  In 
2004, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc.8 expanded the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, paving the 
way for U.S. discovery in aid of ISAs, thereby potentially increasing 
 
Procedure.”). 
 3.  See Lindsay Fortado, Arbitration’s Glamorous Side; Investment Treaty 
Arbitration Rises, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 2 (“Investor-state arbitrations are 
disputes governed by investment treaties (BITs), treaties created by two countries 
to govern investments between them.”). 
 4.  Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
9 Global Arb. Rev., no. 2, Mar. 24, 2014, at 4–6. These figures have increased in 
the last seven years, when the average amount claimed was USD $343,400,000. 
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 57–58 (2007). 
 5.  See Charles T. Kotuby & Luke A. Sobota, Practical Suggestions to 
Promote the Legitimacy and Vitality of International Investment Arbitration, 28 
ICSID REV. 454, 454–55 (2013) (describing investor-state arbitrations as “complex 
international disputes” involving “billions of dollars and the legitimacy of 
sovereign acts” where the aggrieved investor may have “‘bet the company’ on the 
panel’s decision.”). 
 6.  See Fortado, supra note 3, at 2 (quoting Robert Volterra, global co-
chairman of the international dispute resolution group and head of the public 
international law group in the London office of Latham & Watkins). 
 7.  See Kotuby, supra note 5, at 458 n.20 (criticizing the parties’ voluminous 
submissions to the tribunal, totaling 5,291 pages (citing Petroleum Corporation 
and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 Oct. 2012) ¶ 103)). 
 8.  542 U.S. 241 (2004). 
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the complexity, length, and expense of these arbitrations.  In Intel’s 
wake, U.S. courts have routinely allowed Section 1782 discovery in 
aid of BIT arbitrations,9 proving that the statute can be used broadly 
in the ISA context, potentially affecting the outcome of such 
arbitrations.  And now, with its ruling in Republic of Argentina v. 
NML Capital, Ltd.,10 the Supreme Court has opened the door to broad 
discovery relating to the execution of judgments against foreign 
sovereigns, rejecting application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA).  It seems possible that this decision will once again 
increase the amount of discovery sought (and received) in aid of ISA 
disputes, potentially increasing the length and cost of ISA 
proceedings. 
The increasing likelihood of U.S. discovery (through Section 
1782 and otherwise) in aid of ISA disputes raises a question for 
practitioners and their clients: is this development a blessing or a 
curse?  On the positive side, U.S. discovery allows for a more 
fulsome vetting of the important issues of investor rights and state 
sovereignty associated with ISA claims.  Yet, it is often one-sided, 
raising concerns about the fairness of the process.  Moreover, 
extensive discovery can be quite costly and inefficient, thereby 
eliminating many of the benefits associated with arbitration. 
Below, in Section I, we discuss the history and development of 
Section 1782, culminating in the Intel decision.  In Section II, we 
address the developments arising out of Intel, namely the application 
of Section 1782 to ISA disputes.  In Section III, we discuss the NML 
Capital ruling and its likely consequences.  In Section IV, we 
examine the benefits and disadvantages associated with the use of 
Section 1782 discovery in ISA disputes.  Finally, in Section V, we 
propose ways that U.S. discovery can be used in ISA disputes in a 
fair and positive manner. 
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1782: THE INTEL REVOLUTION 
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) reads, in relevant part: 
The district court of the district in which a person 
resides or is found may order him to give his 
testimony or statement or to produce a document or 
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 
 
 9.  Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 127, 128 (2012). 
 10.  134 S. Ct. 2250, 189 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2014). 
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international tribunal, including criminal 
investigations conducted before formal accusation. 
The order may be made pursuant to a . . . request 
made[] by a foreign or international tribunal or upon 
the application of any interested person . . . . The order 
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may 
be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the 
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking 
the testimony or statement or producing the document 
or other thing. To the extent that the order does not 
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall 
be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in 
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.11 
The long history of Section 1782 traces back to 1855, when 
Congress first enacted a statute empowering courts to appoint 
commissioners to respond to letters rogatory and, thus, authorizing 
courts to provide judicial assistance to foreign courts and litigants.12  
The 1855 Act, however, did not succeed in providing greater 
assistance to foreign courts, as the statute was indexed under 
“mistrials,” and, as such, the Act was “lost” and disregarded by the 
courts.13  In 1863, and seemingly unaware of the 1855 Act, Congress 
passed significantly more restrictive legislation regarding discovery 
in foreign cases, which essentially frustrated the effect of the 1855 
Act.14 
After World War II, and in light of the growth of international 
commerce and foreign litigation, Congress enacted the Act of 1948, 
which “adopted the ‘general’ approach of the 1855 Act and rejected 
 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012). 
 12.  Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630. (“That where letters 
rogatory shall have be[en] addressed from any court of a foreign country to any 
circuit court of the United States, and a United States commissioner designated by 
said circuit court to make the examination of witnesses in said letters mentioned, 
said commissioner shall be empowered to compel the witnesses to appear and 
depose in the same manner as to appear and testify in court.”). 
 13.  Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and 
International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 597, 601 & n.18 (1989); Michael 
Campion Miller et al., 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of International Judicial 
Assistance in the United States Courts, 59-May FED. L. 44, 1 (2012); Steven M. 
Saraisky, How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescription to Restore the 
Judge’s Discretion, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1130 & n.12 (1994). 
 14.  Stahr, supra note 13, at 601; Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial 
Assistance: Procedural Chaos and Program for Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 540 
(1953). 
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the ‘limitations’ of the 1863 Act.”15  Still, this approach was 
perceived by critics as “unduly narrow” and not sufficiently broad to 
address the “new era of international cooperation and litigation.”16  
So, in 1964, Congress passed further amendments intended to 
liberalize the statute and to entice other countries to broaden their 
judicial assistance to foreign tribunals.17  The latest amendment to 
Section 1782 was enacted in 1996, at which time Congress expanded 
the statute’s reach once again.18  Since 1996, federal courts have 
heard numerous Section 1782 applications and have differed 
significantly on the interpretation of the statute in various ways.19 
In 2004, with its seminal decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced 
Micro Devices, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court resolved many of the 
differences that had developed among the courts with respect to the 
interpretation of Section 1782.  The Intel dispute arose out of a 
complaint filed by Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), one of 
Intel’s archrivals, with the Directorate General for Competition of the 
Commission of the European Communities (DG-Competition), 
alleging that Intel violated European Union antitrust law.20  After the 
DG-Competition declined to seek judicial assistance in the United 
 
 15.  Stahr, supra note 13, at 602–03 (suggesting Congress found the misplaced 
1855 Act). 
 16.  Id. at 603–04; Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States 
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1965)). 
 17.  S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8–9 (1964). 
 18.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 486 (1996). 
 19.  For example, the courts disagreed on whether Section 1782 imposed a 
foreign discoverability requirement, compare In re Asta Medica, S. A., 981 F.2d 1, 
7 (1st Cir. 1992), and In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 
F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that Section 1782 imposed a foreign 
discoverability requirement), with In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59–60 (2d Cir. 
1993), and In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193–94 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the 
foreign discoverability requirement); whether the foreign proceeding had to be 
pending or imminent, compare In re Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom, 
870 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that the proceeding must be 
“within reasonable contemplation”), with In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 
120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the foreign proceeding must be “imminent—
very likely to occur and very soon to occur”); and the type of foreign or 
international tribunal that qualifies for assistance under Section 1782, compare In 
re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that 
“arbitration is not a tribunal for the purpose of Section 1782” because “Congress 
intended to assist official, governmental bodies” and not unofficial, private 
arbitrations), with In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697‒98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (holding that a private arbitral tribunal is a foreign tribunal under § 1782, but 
denying the request because Technostroy did not obtain a ruling from the arbitral 
tribunal that discovery should take place).  
 20.  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004). 
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States, AMD filed a Section 1782 petition in the Northern District of 
California seeking discovery from Intel for use in the antitrust 
proceeding.21 
The Court had to determine whether these facts met the statutory 
requirements for Section 1782 discovery, which are: (1) that the 
target of the discovery request must reside or be “found” in the 
district court where the Section 1782 petition was filed; (2) that the 
purpose of the discovery must be for use in a “proceeding”; (3) that 
the “proceeding” in question must take place before a foreign or 
international tribunal; and (4) that the Section 1782 discovery request 
must be made by the foreign or international tribunal itself, or by an 
“interested person.”22  The Court noted, however, that Section 1782 
“authorizes, but does not require, . . . discovery assistance” for use in 
a foreign proceeding.23  Thus, once the required elements of the 
statute are met, a court deciding a Section 1782 application still has 
discretion on whether to grant judicial assistance. 
The Intel Court therefore provided a list of non-exclusive factors 
that a court should consider in exercising its discretion, such as 
whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant 
in a foreign proceeding”; “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the 
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of 
the foreign government . . . to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; 
whether “the [Section] 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to 
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a 
foreign country or the United States”; and whether the request is 
“unduly intrusive or burdensome.”24 
This mix of statutory and discretionary factors has become 
known as the Intel test.  In addition to setting the modern standard for 
Section 1782 discovery, Intel is also known for expanding the scope 
and use of the statute. 
The Intel Court ruled upon four important points that were 
subject to disagreement among the Circuits: (1) whether Section 1782 
imposes a foreign discoverability requirement; (2) the parties to 
whom the court’s assistance is available; (3) whether the proceeding 
must be pending or otherwise imminent before a foreign or 
 
 21.  Id. at 250–51. 
 22.  See id. at 249 (determining whether these facts met the 1782 requirements); 
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 
 23.  Intel, 542 U.S. at 266. 
 24.  Id. at 264–65. 
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international tribunal; and (4) whether DG-Competition 
investigations (and other “quasi-judicial” functions) qualify as 
proceedings under the statute.25 
The Court answered each of these questions in a manner that 
favored expanded discovery under Section 1782.  As to the proposed 
“foreign discoverability requirement,” the Court held that “[b]eyond 
shielding material safeguarded by an applicable privilege, . . . nothing 
in the text of §1782 limits a district court’s production-order authority 
to materials that could be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the 
materials were located there.”26  Next, the Court held that the text of 
the statute, “‘upon the application of any interested person,’ plainly 
reaches beyond the universe of persons designated ‘litigant’” to 
include a person who “possess[es] a reasonable interest in obtaining 
[judicial] assistance.”27  The Intel Court rejected the notion that the 
foreign proceeding in question must be pending, or even “imminent.”  
Rather, the court found that the test was whether “a dispositive 
ruling . . . [was] within reasonable contemplation.”28 
Finally, relying on the legislative history of Section 1782, the 
Court held that the DG-Competition was a “foreign or international 
tribunal” under the statute, which extends to administrative and 
quasi-judicial agencies.29  Importantly for our purposes, the Court 
noted that, according to at least one source, “the term ‘tribunal’ . . . 
includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral 
tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, 
commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.”30 
III. POST-INTEL: THE U.S. COURTS EXPAND SECTION 1782 TO BIT 
ARBITRATION 
In the wake of Intel, the Courts began to apply Section 1782 
much more broadly and in a number of different contexts.  For our 
purposes, however, only one is truly important: the U.S. Courts—
which had previously opposed the use of Section 1782 in 
 
 25.  Id. at 246–47; Roger J. Johns & Anne Keaty, The New and Improved 
Section 1782: Supercharging Federal District Court Discovery Assistance to 
Foreign and International Tribunals, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 649, 650–51 (2006). 
 26.  Intel, 542 U.S. at 260. 
 27.  Id. at 256. 
 28.  Id. at 259.  
 29.  Id. at 243, 257–58 (quoting 63 Stat. 1743; S. REP. NO. 88–1580, at 7–8). 
 30.  Id. at 258 (quoting Smit, supra note 16, at 1026 n.71, 1027 n.73 (emphasis 
added)). 
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“arbitration-related matters”31—began to authorize its use in the 
arbitration context.  In the words of one jurist: “The judicial 
prohibition on using Section 1782 in connection with arbitral 
proceedings was absolute and largely unquestioned until 2004, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a more expansive interpretation of 
the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ than had previously been 
seen in the lower courts.”32  After Intel, at least with respect to 
Investor-State (treaty-based) arbitrations,33 the U.S. federal courts 
committed a complete reversal.  Virtually all federal courts that have 
addressed the question now “agree that an arbitral tribunal 
established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty constitutes an 
‘international tribunal’ within the meaning of the statute.”34 
Interestingly, many of these Section 1782 actions arise out of a 
single (yet long-running and massive) dispute between Chevron 
Corporation and the Republic of Ecuador.35  This cross-border dispute 
has spawned not only multiple lawsuits in the U.S. and in Ecuador, 
but also an investor-state arbitration under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT and 
numerous enforcement proceedings around the globe.36  Both sides to 
 
 31.  Strong, supra note 1, at 302; see also Alford, supra note 9, at 133–34 
(“Before 2004 it was widely assumed that Section 1782 discovery orders were 
unavailable in aid of international arbitration.”); NBC v. Bear Stearns, 165 F.3d 
184, 190‒91 (concluding that Section 1782 does not cover international arbitration 
because arbitration is a creature of contract where the parties could have set up 
discovery procedures; therefore, opening the door to broad discovery would 
undermine significantly the advantages of arbitration); Rep. of Kazakhstan v. 
Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing the lower court and 
finding that “the term ‘foreign and international tribunals’ in § 1782 was not 
intended to authorize resort to United States federal courts to assist discovery in 
private international arbitrations”); In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 
403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Section 1782 does not apply to international arbitration). 
 32.  Strong, supra note 1, at 302. 
 33.  The courts are split on whether private international commercial arbitration 
qualifies under the statute. See Alford, supra note 9, at 135–36 nn.47 & 51; see also 
Strong, supra note 1, at 315 n.112. 
 34.  Alford, supra note 9, at 136; see, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 
161 (3d Cir. 2011) (Investor-State UNCITRAL arbitration qualifies as a foreign 
tribunal under 1782); In re Mesa Power Grp., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 1296, 1302–03 
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (same); Rep. of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 
(D. Col. 2011) (same); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) aff’d 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (same); Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F. 
Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass. 2010)  (same); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 
(D.D.C. 2010) (same); In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB, 2010 
WL 8767265, *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010) (same). But see Rep. of Ecuador v. 
Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling on grounds of estoppel and 
thereby circumventing the issue, leaving unaltered existing precedent that an 
international arbitration tribunal is not a tribunal under Section 1782). 
 35.  Alford, supra note 9, at 137.  
 36.  See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 
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the dispute (Chevron and Ecuador) have filed numerous Section 1782 
proceedings seeking U.S. discovery from non-party witnesses.37 
The evidence collected through the Section 1782 proceedings 
has enabled Chevron and Ecuador to introduce evidence in the BIT 
proceedings that they otherwise likely would not have been able to 
obtain.38  This is because discovery in BIT arbitrations generally is 
governed by the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, under which 
depositions are very rare (witness testimony is provided in written 
statements),39 interrogatories are uncommon, and only “narrow and 
specific” requests for documents are allowed.40  Fishing expeditions 
are simply not permitted.41  And, perhaps most importantly, BIT 
 
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/09/reversal-of-fortune-
2?currentPage=all (initial suit commenced by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs in the town 
of Lago Agrio, Ecuador in May 2003 and resulted in a judgment against Chevron 
for USD $18 billion); Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of 
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 3 
(UNCITRAL arbitration initiated by Chevron alleging that Ecuador breached the 
Ecuador-U.S. BIT and investment agreements); Yaiguaje v Chevron Corp., [2013] 
ONSC 2527 (Can.) (enforcement action related to litigation in Ecuador). 
 37.  Alford, supra note 9, at 143–45; see, e.g., Rep. of Ecuador v. Connor, 708 
F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011); 
In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2011); Rep. of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 
801 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Col. 2011); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-00052 
GSA, 2011 WL 4089189 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Rep. of Ecuador, Nos. C 
11-80171 CRB, C 11-80172 CRB, 2011 WL 4434816 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); 
Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass 2010); In re Chevron 
Corp., et al., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Veiga, F. Supp. 2d 8 
(D.D.C. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2010); In re 
Chevron Corp., No. 2:10-cv-02675(SRC), 2010 WL 8767338 (D.N.J. June 15, 
2010); Chevron Corp. v. Champ, Nos. 1:10mc 27, 1:10mc 28, 2010 WL 3418394 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00686, 2010 L 
8767266 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2010); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 
MISC., 2010 WL 3702427 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010); In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. 
1:10-mc-00040 GSA, 2010 WL 4027740 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010); In re Chevron 
Corp., No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB, 2010 WL 8767265 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010); 
In re Rep. of Ecuador, No. 4:11mc73-RH/WCS, 2011 WL 10618727 (N.D. Fla. 
Aug. 24, 2011).  
 38.  Alford, supra note 9, at 146–47.  
 39.  See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, 
International Bar Association (29 May 2010) art. 4 [hereinafter “IBA Rules”] 
(providing that “each Party shall identify the witnesses on whose testimony it 
intends to rely and the subject matter of that testimony” and “[t]he Arbitral 
Tribunal may order each Party to submit within a specified time to the Arbitral 
Tribunal and to the other Parties Witness Statements by each witness”). 
 40.  See IBA Rules art. 3(3)(a) (“A Request to Produce [documents] shall 
contain: . . . (i) a description of each requested Document sufficient to identify it, or 
(ii) a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and 
specific requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist.”). 
 41.  Alford, supra note 9, at 142; compare IBA Rules arts. 2(3), 3(3)(b) (where 
the standard applied to evidence requests is that the information must be “relevant 
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tribunals generally “have no authority to request documents or oral 
testimony” from non-parties.42  It is in this last regard—non-party 
discovery—where Section 1782 is able to fill the biggest gap. 
Chevron’s denial-of-justice BIT claim is still pending, but 
Chevron has received several favorable interim orders and awards 
that may not have been rendered in the absence of the evidence 
collected using Section 1782.43  For instance, on January 25, 2012, 
the tribunal issued an interim award directing Ecuador to “take all 
measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the 
enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador against any 
judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio Case” and to inform 
the tribunal as to the measures taken for the implementation of the 
Interim Award.44  Less than a month later, the tribunal restated this 
order and added that Ecuador should institute “measures to preclude 
any certification by [Ecuador] that would cause the said judgments to 
be enforceable against [Chevron].”45  Although the interim awards do 
not provide the tribunal’s reasoning for reaching its decisions, 
Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures shows that Chevron 
provided the tribunal with evidence—in the form of depositions and 
emails—obtained through discovery requests in the U.S.46 This shows 
that Section 1782 has at least the potential to be a game-changer in 
certain BIT arbitrations. 
IV. WILL ARGENTINA V. NML CAPITAL FURTHER INCREASE 
DISCOVERY IN ISA DISPUTES? 
In 2014, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., which allowed broad discovery 
relating to the execution of judgments against a sovereign state, 
rejecting application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
 
to the case and material to its outcome”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (which 
allows discovery of any information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence,” even if the information sought is itself 
inadmissible).  
 42.  Alford, supra note 9, at 142. 
 43.  Id. at 146–47. 
 44.  Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures, 16 (Jan. 25, 2012). 
 45.  Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, ¶ 3 (Feb. 16, 
2012). 
 46.  Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Rep. of Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures dated, ¶¶ 51, 58, 
157‒58 (Apr. 1, 2010). 
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in that context and effectively limiting the FSIA to its express terms.47  
The dispute arose out of Argentina’s 2001 default on its external debt 
and its subsequent offer to restructure its outstanding bonds.48  
Although most of the bondholders agreed with the restructuring plan, 
NML did not.49  Instead, “NML brought 11 actions against Argentina 
in the Southern District of New York to collect on its debt, and 
prevailed in every one.”50  The problem for NML, however, is that it 
has not been able to execute any of the judgments. 
In an attempt to locate Argentina’s property, NML requested 
discovery from two banks (Bank of America and Banco de la Nación 
Argentina) seeking documents relating to Argentina’s assets, their 
location, records, history, etc.51  Argentina opposed this discovery 
request on the ground that the FSIA prohibits a court from ordering 
discovery of assets owned by a foreign sovereign because those 
assets are immune.52  The narrow issue for the Court was whether the 
FSIA “imposes a limit on a United States court’s authority to order 
blanket post-judgment execution discovery on the assets of a foreign 
state used for any activity anywhere in the world.”53  The Court 
held—in a 7-1 decision—that the FSIA provides jurisdictional and 
execution immunity to a foreign sovereign, but that it does not 
provide immunity from discovery of the sovereign’s assets in the 
U.S. or abroad.54 
Of particular note is the Court’s statement that: “[A]ny sort of 
immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court 
must stand on the Act’s text.  Or it must fail.”55  Applying this rule, 
the Court found that “[t]here is no . . . provision forbidding or 
limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign 
judgment debtor’s assets” in the FSIA,56 and therefore rejected 
Argentina’s arguments under the FSIA. 
 
 47.  See NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2256 (discussing the FSIA’s silence on 
limiting discovery against sovereign states).  
 48.  Id. at 2253. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 2254. 
 53.  NML Capital, 134 S. Ct., at 2255. 
 54.  Id. at 2253–59. 
 55.  Id. at 2256. 
 56.  Id. (“The Act speaks of discovery only once, in a subsection requiring 
courts to stay discovery requests directed to the United States that would interfere 
with criminal or national-security matters.”). 
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Does this open the door to Section 1782 discovery directly 
against a sovereign respondent or its agents or instrumentalities in a 
BIT case?  To the best of our knowledge, no such Section 1782 
petition has ever been attempted.  However, a few months ago, in 
Mare Shipping, Inc. v. Squire Sanders, LLP,57 one litigant came close.  
There, Mare filed a Section 1782 application seeking discovery from 
Spain’s U.S. attorneys (Squire Sanders).58 The court found, based on 
NML Capital and a textual reading of the FSIA, that a foreign 
sovereign’s U.S. counsel is excluded from the definition of 
“sovereign, or its ‘agency or instrumentality’” under the FSIA.59  
Therefore, Section 1782 discovery would be permitted.60  In adhering 
to a textual reading of the FSIA, the Supreme Court and the Second 
Circuit seemed to agree with the proposition that a discovery order 
directed at a third party does not infringe a sovereign’s immunity 
under the FSIA because compliance will cause the sovereign “no 
burden and no expense” so long as the subpoenas do not reveal 
sensitive information.61 
As demonstrated by the Mare case, the NML Capital decision 
makes it more likely that investor-state claimants may soon try to 
seek Section 1782 discovery directly against a sovereign opponent in 
an ISA dispute.  Whether or not they would succeed is a complicated 
question for another day.  In particular, pursuant to the FSIA, foreign 
states are immune from “the jurisdiction” of the United States 
courts.62  As a result, any attempt to seek discovery directly from a 
foreign sovereign through Section 1782 would presumably have to 
satisfy one of the exceptions to the FSIA,63 making for a complicated 
analysis.  Nonetheless, given what seems to be an ever-expanding 
scope of U.S. discovery in aid of international investor-state 
arbitration, we all should be asking: is this shift a blessing or a curse? 
 
 57.  Mare Shipping, Inc. v. Squire Sanders, LLP, 574 F. App’x. 6 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
 58.  Id. at 6–7 
 59.  Id. at 9. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. (citing EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 
2012), aff’d, NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250). 
 62.  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
 63.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(6) (2008) (providing exceptions to 
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state). 
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V. IS DISCOVERY IN AID OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION A 
BLESSING OR A CURSE? 
There are several arguments in favor of U.S. discovery in aid of 
Investor-State arbitrations.  First, as Justice Brandeis once famously 
said, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”64  In other 
words, the idea that a full vetting of the facts of each case leads to the 
truth is what drives the U.S. system of discovery.  In the case of 
Investor-State arbitrations, where the sovereign functions of a state 
are alleged to have violated international law, important questions 
related to public policy and the global investment climate are at 
issue.65  One could certainly argue that this is a space in which 
maximum “sunlight” is desirable. 
Second, sovereign respondents are considered favored by certain 
“procedural asymmetries” in investment arbitrations, giving States an 
ability (and an incentive) to make it difficult for investors to prove 
their case.66  Take, for example, a typical denial-of-justice case, 
where evidence of judicial bias, ex parte communications, and even 
bribe-taking could easily be hidden by the State and therefore would 
be unavailable to the claimant-investor absent Section 1782 discovery 
(or another type of discovery) from non-party witnesses.67  In this 
light, one can argue that Section 1782 may be essential to seeing 
justice done in certain ISA disputes. 
Third, and relatedly, Section 1782 discovery allows for an 
examination of evidence held by non-parties, who (as noted above) 
are usually outside the scope of discovery in international arbitration 
matters.68  This is important, because (as noted above) parties that are 
inclined to violate principles of law and rules of conduct are often not 
opposed to hiding evidence in the context of a dispute arising out of 
their wrongdoing.  If an arbitration party’s only source of evidence is 
her opponent, she may never receive the materials needed to prove 
 
 64.  LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY – AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914). 
 65.  See Kotuby, supra note 5, at 455–56 (citing Toby T. Landau, Reasons for 
Reasons: The Tribunal’s Duty in Investor-State Arbitration, in 50 YEARS OF THE 
NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, 
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 195, 202 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009). See also 
Critical Case Studies, THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 2 (Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman eds. 2008) 
(concluding that “the reasons requirement . . . acquires a greater importance in 
international investment arbitration” than commercial arbitration)). 
 66.  Strong, supra note 1, at 359 & n.381. 
 67.  See Alford, supra note 9, at 146. 
 68.  Id. at 150.  
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her case.  However, if she can access evidence in the hands of non-
parties, through the compulsory discovery process of the U.S. federal 
courts, her chances of prevailing increase dramatically.  In this 
regard, Section 1782 could increase the likelihood that the truth will 
emerge.69 
Finally, Section 1782 discovery has the potential to alter a Host 
State’s incentives and force the state to “reconcile[ ] international 
obligations with domestic political preferences.”70  In other words, 
expanded discovery may have a positive deterrent effect in favor of 
the Rule of Law.  Many states (and their leaders) face a domestic 
political climate in which foreign investors are negatively viewed as 
outsiders intent on stripping the country of its wealth and resources 
for export.  When faced only with such a domestic political 
landscape, the sovereign is easily tempted to take expropriatory 
action against foreign investors, to the satisfaction of the local 
constituency.  When currying favor with the local populace comes at 
the potential cost of being forced by a BIT tribunal to pay millions of 
dollars in damages to the foreign investor, however, the calculus 
changes.  And satisfying domestic political whims becomes even less 
appealing if it is likely that the damaged investor can use Section 
1782 to discover concrete evidence against the expropriating state. 
But the foregoing benefits come at a cost—one that some would 
argue is too steep to pay.  The most obvious disadvantage of Section 
1782 discovery in ISA disputes is the one that started off our 
discussion: arbitration generally is supposed to be—and usually is 
expected to be—a faster, cheaper, more efficient alternative to 
litigation.  That is one reason why parties choose to enter into 
arbitration agreements and investment treaties.  But the introduction 
of U.S. discovery into the mix certainly has at least the potential to 
eliminate those benefits.71  This is especially true when one considers 
that some federal courts have found that Section 1782 and the Federal 
 
 69.  An additional benefit may be the ability to verify the veracity of a claim 
before going to the expense of bringing an investor-state dispute. Because Section 
1782 can be used in cases where the foreign or international proceeding is not 
imminent, but only within reasonable contemplation, see Intel, 542 U.S. at 259, at 
least one court has held that Section 1782 can be used with respect to an 
anticipated, but as yet unnoticed, arbitration. See In re Application of Winning 
(HK) Shipping Co., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
30, 2010) (denying motion to quash discovery for use in an unfiled, anticipated 
arbitration). One can argue that, in this way, Section 1782 could be used to 
investigate and further meritorious claims, while weeding out the weak or frivolous 
ones. 
 70.  Alford, supra note 9, at 129.  
 71.  Strong, supra note 1, at 302 & n.33, 319; Alford, supra note 9, at 153.  
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Rules of Civil Procedure authorize discovery of any materials within 
the possession, custody, or control of the person “found” in the U.S., 
even if that material is located all over the globe.72  As noted above, 
however, Investor-State arbitration has never truly fit into the “faster, 
cheaper” mold of arbitration, and it seems unlikely that the parties to 
such cases are focused on efficiency and cost.  Rather, they are 
probably focused on having a neutral, expert panel of public 
international jurists to decide complex and weighty issues of 
international law.  Nonetheless, there are other, even stronger 
criticisms of using Section 1782 discovery in ISA disputes. 
As Professor Strong has noted, while U.S. lawyers are familiar, 
and therefore comfortable, with American-style discovery, most non-
U.S. lawyers and clients view it with absolute “horror,” as it is so 
much more invasive and expensive than their own legal systems 
would permit.73  The fact that U.S. courts have so much “discretion” 
in granting Section 1782 petitions does nothing to alleviate that fear, 
as it opens the door for judicially-sanctioned harassment in cases 
gone wrong.74 
Another common criticism of Section 1782 discovery is that it is 
“one-sided” and therefore inherently unfair.  It will be the rare 
investor-state case (like the Chevron-Ecuador dispute) where 
discovery supportive of both sides is available from a person “found” 
in the United States.  This means that one party to an ISA dispute 
would have access to broad Section 1782 discovery, while the other 
side would be limited to the much more modest discovery available 
under the IBA Rules (or another state’s applicable domestic 
procedures).75  The unfairness inherent in such a scenario is obvious. 
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE USE OF SECTION 1782 IN 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS GOING FORWARD 
Given the valid concerns listed above, how can the U.S. Courts 
ensure that Section 1782 is used to benefit, and not abuse, the 
evidence-gathering process in Investor-State arbitrations?  One 
 
 72.  In re Chevron, No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at *9 (S.D. Fla. June 
12, 2012); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (exercising discretion 
to grant discovery of documents in possession, custody or control of the person 
from whom the documents were requested even though the documents were located 
abroad). 
 73.  Strong, supra note 1, at 351; Alford, supra note 9, at 139, 141. 
 74.  Strong, supra note 1, at 351–52; Alford, supra note 9, at 150 (noting the 
potential for “abuse” of Section 1782 discovery). 
 75.  Cf. Alford, supra note 9, at 142. 
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suggestion for capitalizing on the benefits of Section 1782 discovery 
while minimizing the harms would be to order that any discovery 
sought be “reciprocal.”  This approach would eliminate one of the 
major criticisms of expanded discovery—its inherent one-sidedness.  
Reciprocal discovery would also counsel in favor of more modest 
Section 1782 applications if the applicant knows he could be ordered 
to produce discovery of a similar scope.  That a district court would 
have discretion to order reciprocal discovery is clear from the Intel 
decision itself, where the Court explicitly stated that “a district court 
could condition relief [under the statute] upon [the applicant’s] 
reciprocal exchange of information.”76 
Another suggestion, trumpeted by Professor Alford, is that 
federal courts use their statutory discretion to “limit discovery to that 
which is available in international arbitration or foreign 
proceedings.”77  This would eliminate concerns about one-sidedness, 
while also mitigating non-U.S. fears about the horrors of American 
discovery.  That said, such a restriction would seemingly prevent 
parties to BIT arbitrations from getting access to otherwise 
inaccessible—yet necessary—materials in support of their public 
international law claims.78  Thus, this type of limitation on Section 
1782 discovery would have to be approached with care, probably by 
granting any reasonable discovery requests that would technically be 
allowed under the IBA Rules, no matter how unlikely such discovery 
might be in the practice of ISA cases. 
Finally, we suggest that U.S. Courts faced with Section 1782 
petitions should exercise their broad discretion in other ways to 
ensure that the statute is used fairly and properly.  Indeed, the Courts 
have already done so, exercising their discretion to: (i) disallow 
 
 76.  Intel, 542 U.S. at 262.  
 77.  Alford, supra note 9, at 153.  
 78.  For instance, in the Chevron cases much of the evidence was obtained in 
the form of non-party deposition testimony, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-
cv-00691-LAK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014) (Docket No. 1874) (noting that 
“[m]uch of the evidence in this case,” which came in the form of depositions, 
emails and a trove of documents, was obtained through a Section 1782 proceeding 
in In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir. 2010)), which is 
generally disallowed under the IBA Rules. See R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford & 
W. Michael Reisman, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY 15, § 1.10 (2005) (explaining that, although international 
arbitrations do not have formal rules of taking evidence, tribunals often refer to the 
IBA Rules, under which voluminous discovery involving broad-category document 
requests and oral depositions are usually not permitted, unless the parties agree). 
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discovery that is otherwise authorized by the statute;79 (ii) limit the 
type or amount of discovery that is ultimately authorized;80 and (iii) 
place conditions on the use of that discovery, such as subjecting the 
materials produced to a confidentiality agreement or protective 
order.81 
By implementing such limiting principles on the use of Section 
1782 discovery, the statute can be used to benefit ISA disputes 
without harming the process. 
 
 
 79.  See, e.g., In re Application of Inversiones y Gasolinera Petroleos 
Valenzuela, 2011 WL 181211, at *16-17 (finding that the statutory prerequisites for 
Section 1782 are present, but nonetheless denying petitioner’s motion to compel 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45). 
 80.  See, e.g., In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (refusing to hold that Section 
1782 limits discovery to documents physically located in the United States, but 
nevertheless exercising its discretion to so limit the discovery ordered in this case). 
 81.  In re HydroDive Nigeria Ltd., No 13-MC-0477, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Tex. 
May 29, 2013) (subjecting all discovery ordered to the provisions of an attorney’s 
eyes only confidentiality agreement, to mitigate the concerns of the Respondent 
corporation). 
